Investigations on Evolution of Approaches Developed for Data Privacy

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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews methods developed for anonymizing data from 1984 to 1988. Publishing microdata such as census or patient data for extensive research and other purposes is an important problem area being focused by government agencies and other social associations. The traditional approach identified through literature survey reveals that the approach of eliminating uniquely identifying fields such as social security number from microdata, still results in disclosure of sensitive data. k-anonymity optimization algorithm seems to be promising and powerful in certain cases, still carrying the restrictions that optimized k-anonymity are NP-hard, thereby leading to severe computational challenges. k-anonymity faces the problem of homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. The notion of l-diversity proposed in the literature to address this issue also poses a number of constraints, as it proved to be inefficient to prevent attribute disclosure (skewness attack and similarity attack). l-diversity is difficult to achieve and may not provide sufficient privacy protection against sensitive attribute across equivalence class can substantially improve the privacy as against information disclosure limitation techniques such as sampling cell suppression rounding and data swapping and perturbation. This paper aims to discuss efficient anonymization approach that requires partitioning of microdata equivalence classes and by minimizing closeness by kernel smoothing and determining either move distances by controlling the distribution pattern of sensitive attribute in a microdata and also maintaining diversity.

KEYWORDS: Data Anonymization, Microdata, k-anonymity, Identity Disclosure, Attribute Disclosure, Diversity

I. INTRODUCTION

Privacy-An important factor need to be considered while we publishing the microdatas. Usually government agencies and other organization used to publish the microdatas. On releasing the microdatas, the sensitive information of the individuals are being disclosed. This constitutes a major problem in the government and organizational sector for releasing the microdata. In order to sector or to prevent the sensitive information, we are going to implement certain algorithms and methods. Normally there two types of information disclosures they are: Identity disclosure and Attribute disclosure. Identity disclosure occurs when an individual's linked to a particular record in the released Attribute disclosure occurs when new information about some individuals are revealed.(i.e)the released data make it possible to infer the characteristics of an accurately than it would be possible before the data released. The Knowledge of identity disclosure would often allow us to know about attributes disclosure.Once the identity disclosure comes into exists ,the individuals sensitive information is reidentified. Due to the effects of false attributes ,an observer of a release table may incorrectly perceive that an individuals. sensitive attribute takes a particular value. This can harm the individuals even if the perception is incorrect. When the table is released, it present disclosure risk to the individual who are all in table.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals about basic definition and primitives of data anonymization. Protection and resource control in operating systems are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 portrays Computer Security System For a Time Shared Computer Accessed Over Telephone Lines. Section 5 briefs about Computer Security Systems. Section 6 briefs about network security without observability. Section 7 Concludes the paper and outline the direction for Future Work.
Data refers to organized personal information in the form of rows and columns. Row refers to individual tuple or record and column refers to the field. Tuple that forms a part of a single table are not necessarily unique. Column of a table is referred to as attribute that refers to the field of information, thereby an attribute can be concluded as domain. It is necessary that attribute that forms a part of the table should be unique. According to L.Sweeney et.al., (2001) [26] each row in a table is an ordered n-tuple of values <d1,d2,...,dn> such that each value dj forms a part of the domain of jth column for j=1,2,...n where ‘n’ denoted the number of columns.

Attributes
Consider a relation \( R(a_1, a_2, ..., a_n) \) with finite set of tuples. Then the finite set of attributes of \( R \) are \{a1, a2,...,an\}, provided a table \( R(a_1, a_2, ..., a_n) \), \{a1, a2,...,aj\} \( \subseteq \{a_1, a_2, ..., a_n\} \) and a tuple \( l \in R \), \( l[a_1,...,a_n] \) corresponds to ordered set of values \( v_1,...,v_j \) of \( a_1,...,a_j \) in \( l \) R \[a_1,...,a_n] \( \) corresponds to projection of attribute values \( a_1, a_2,...,a_n \) in \( R \), thereby maintaining tuple duplicates.

According to Ningui Li, Tiancheng Li et.al., [17] (2010), attributes among itself can be divided into 3 categories namely
1. Explicit identifiers- Attributes that clearly identifies individuals. For eg, Social Security Number for a US citizen.
2. Quasi identifiers- Attributes whose values when taken together can potentially identify an individual. Eg., postal code, age, sex of a person. Combination of these values can lead to disclosure of personal information.
3. Sensitive identifiers- That are attributes needed to be supplied for researchers keeping the identifiers anonymous. For eg, ‘disease’ attribute in a hospital database, ‘salary’ attribute in an employee database.

### TABLE 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Zipcode</th>
<th>Disease (Sensitive Information)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>0213</td>
<td>Shortbreath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>Shortbreath</td>
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<tr>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0213</td>
<td>Obesity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>0214</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>0214</td>
<td>Chestpain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Quasi- Identifiers
As proposed by L.Sweeney et.al., (2001) [26], A single attribute or a set of attributes that, in combination with some outside world information that can identify a single individual tuple in a relation is termed as quasi-identifier. Given a set of entities \( E \), and a table \( B(a_1,...,a_n) \), \( f_B: E \rightarrow B \) and \( f_E: B \rightarrow E' \), where \( E \rightarrow E' \). A quasi-identifier of \( B \), written as \( U_{k_0} \), is a set of attributes \{a1,...,aj\} \( \rightarrow \{a_1,...,a_n\} \) where: \( \exists \lambda_i \in U \) such that \( f_B(f_E(s_i))[U_{k_0}] = s_i \).

### k-Anonymity
Let \( RT(A1,A2,...,An) \) be a table and \( QRT \) be the Quasi identifier. \( RT \) is said to be k-anonymous [26] if and only if each sequence of values in \( RT[QRT] \) appears atleast k-times in \( RT[QRT] \). In short, the Quasi identifier must appear atleast ‘k’ times in \( RT \), where \( k=1,2,3,... \) where ‘k’ is termed to be the anonymity of the table.

### l-diversity
Since k-anonymity failed to secure the attribute disclosure, and is susceptible to homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack A.Machanavajjhala et.al., (2006) [38] introduced a new privacy notation called ‘l-diversity’[20]. An equivalence class is said to possess l-diversity if there are atleast l well represented values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to have l-diversity if every equivalence class of the table has l-diversity. Here the technique is the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class is distributed with l-well represented values. Generally there are four types of l-diversity.

1) Distinct l-diversity: This ensures that there are atleast l-distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class. The biggest disadvantage here is that distinct l-diversity fails to prevent probabilistic inference attacks.
2) Probabilistic 1-diversity: An anonymised table is said to be probabilistic 1-diversity if the frequency of the sensitive value in each group is at most 1/l.

3) Entropy 1-diversity: It is defined by. 
\[ E = \sum_{s \in S} P(s) \log P(s) \]
where ‘s’ is the sensitive attribute.

4) Recursive(c,l) diversity: This technique proceeds by making, the value appearing most frequently, not appear too frequently and less frequently appearing value not to appear too rarely.

One problem with 1-diversity is that it is limited in its assumption of adversarial knowledge. I-diversity fails to prevent attribute disclosure and is susceptible to two types of attacks.

**t-closeness**

Privacy is measured by the information gain of an observer. Before seeing the released table the observer may think that something might happen to the sensitive attribute value of a single person. After seeing the released table the observer may have the details about the sensitive attributes. t-closeness [17] should have the distance between the class and the whole table is no more than a threshold t, Ningui Li et al., (2010)[17].

**III. PROTECTION AND RESOURCE CONTROL IN DISTURBED OPERATING SYSTEMS**

Sape J. Mullender, Andrew S. Tanenbaum (1984) Local networks have cable snaking along with sockets which is used by the users to plug their PC, intelligent terminals, file servers, etc. These devices are called as “producers” since they provide service to “consumers”. It is difficult to build a secure Operating System where the system administrator is unable to prevent malicious users from plugging. This paper describes how to build a secure Operating System without restrictions. We need end-to-end encryption protection method to avoid passive or active wire tappers.

The main problem in anonymous network is authentication. In this paper, authentication doesn’t produce any attack. It describes about the knowledge of some critical information to control access to services.

The basic model of the distributed system is called as “service”. The main part of the service is that one of servers is used to access each object in a service. From a port on the client process, a message (request) is sent to each server. In return, the server sends a reply from a port on the server process to the client. Each port consists of 2 names – 1.put-port :–used by clients, 2.get-port :used by servers.

“Signature” is often used to determine the user who signed in. Signature has some properties: only the “owner” of the document has right to sign in the document. If we user ports as signature, there are two types: 1.Public signature- checks whether the signature is genuine or not. 2.Private signature – required to sign in.

In this proposed protection scheme, a “capability” mode of bit-string is used to perform operations on objects. It consists of 4 parts: 1.Server field of capability – used by put-port. 2.Object field used a index, 3.Rights field-Specifies the type of operation, 4.Random field-sparse capability. In a protected Operating System, kernel can be used to maintain capabilities. But we can’t trust the kernel’s in user machines. So, we are forced to use a protection mechanism where port names are selected randomly and port names are selected randomly and port name space is made sparse.

The directory server is a tree-like structure that provides a private directory to each user to maintain capabilities. In order to use the directory service, a client may encrypt the ports. A login server is used to authenticate a user.

Open System Interconnection [OSI] was proposed by ISO with 7 layers of protocol. LAN doesn’t contain network layer which is often used for routing and congestion control. But our idea is to make these capabilities as address to create another form of network layer. This newly formed network layer is used to receive messages in the destination with the help of put-port and get-port. Even we can also use “public key encryption” to make this new network layer to be more secure under certain considerations.

Lower protocol layers are used by port layer to implement this message passing technique. And the system calls or subroutines are used to implement port layer. In a user Interface, there are 2 calls for client and server which is same as that is used for sending and receiving messages.

\[ \text{Eg: put(var put port, srcport , signature : PORT ; var buffer: MESSAGE)}; \]
\[ \text{get(var getport, srcport, signature : PORT; var buffer: MESSAGE)}; \]
Object, rights and random fields are combined together to build a library layer to make message passing easier.

In network protection, we establish a hardware interface between user machines and cable. In order to provide certain control, this network interface is included in a logic board of user’s machine. The interface should be tamperproof. Interface should be capable of monitoring all kinds of traffic that occurs in a cable. This network protection scheme works on one-way ciphers where a function F is associated with get-port and put-port by the formula.

\[ \text{Put-port} = F(\text{get-port}) \]

When we create a service, “make port” selects a random number from the address space to use it as get-port. The client uses a put-port to send message to the server. In order to receive message, the server has to use the function F by including get-port. The put-port which is computed is stored in a table. Each time when the message is passed, the interface checks the table for destination port. If it is found, then the interface copies the message to user machine. Since only the put-port is known publicly, the intruder will find difficult to determine the server’s get port number which is kept as secret. Also, we are using port space to select get-ports randomly. So, there is no way for an intruder to obtain the port used by the server. “Signed messages” can also be sent using one way function, with the help of private and public signatures. Both the signatures field and the srcport field are encrypted on transmitted message. Eg: consider server A and B. Assume X is sending a message from B’s put-port A. In turn, A sends a reply to B without knowing that the sender is X. Now B, after receiving message from A, it will assume the message as request and will send a reply to A. Again A will and will assume the message as request and so on.

In case, if the network user’s physical machine numbers for routing then a “locate message” is sent to all interfaces. After receiving the replies, the sender interface will select the exact physical address to be used. In a star-shaped network, the one-way function mechanism is used in such a way that the functions are performed by switch instead of interfaces. Only if the secret ports are revealed, the intruder can steal the message which is completely impossible.

In a network protection problem, the Operating System important solution is public-key cryptography in which a kernel or interface is not needed. Both the messages and ports are encrypted to transfer information in a secure way between the server and the client. A public key is used for encryption. This key pair is created using “make port” with port-identifier, encryption/decryption key. All the messages are encrypted and decrypted using these keys and sent to the server. The entire message need not be encrypted; it is enough to encrypt the header alone. We need to use checksum when we encrypt the entire message.

The servers and put-port key is used to encrypt the requests and the clients put-port key is used to encrypt the replies.

Object-oriented protection system based on capability is easily built on this protection mechanism. When a server creates a new object, the server returns a message along with object capability. It makes use of object field, server field, rights field and random field.

There may be causes existing in which the capabilities are able to perform all the operations with partial rights and no rights field.

In object-oriented protection system, it is easy to detect the vulnerable activities because the capabilities are modified with their address spaces. The clients can also have redundant copy of its capabilities are returned back to the client.

The above discussed are the mechanisms used to enhance the protection in distributed and network Operating System. Compared with other protection schemes, here we don’t need any special components for authentication. A controlled environment will be efficient only if a trustworthy Operating System is used. But here, these protection schemes can support any untrustworthy Operating System. One-way function is less expensive compared to public-key cryptography. One-way function is computed by assigning each interface a processor. Also we require a table to maintain put-port numbers.

Whenever a message is sent on a cable interface will store the message I a buffer. The destination port of the message is determined and it is compared with the port table. If it is similar, the message is passed or it is ignored. When compared to public-key cryptography, one-way function can easily generate keys with more efficiency. The keys
in public key cryptography are layer than in one-way function. It’s efficiency is also less because its needs signed messages to be retrieved.

Implementing distributed and network Operating System will enhance the protection and improves security. No central authority is needed. OSI model is more simple because it derives separate channels for communication between the lower layers of protocol. Wire-tapping is avoided by using end-to-end encryption method. The one-way mechanism and public-key cryptography can be implemented using any software thus providing more secure way of communication.

IV. COMPUTER SECURITY SYSTEM FOR A TIME SHARED COMPUTER ACCESSED OVER TELEPHONE LINES

Paul J. Levine (1985) The time-shared computer uses an automatic tracing equipment of a telephone switching systems to prevent unauthorized access. The telephone system whenever a user uses the telephone system to access the central computer. At the same time, a password that addresses a memory is provided to the time-shared, central computer by the user. A comparison is made between the telephone no of authorized users and telephone no of calling user. If the result shows that the calling user is from proper telephone station, then the access is permitted or it will be denied.

By using unchangeable telephone no’s the authorized user identity cannot be altered. And also avoiding access to the system program will prevent tampering.

Remote users accessing a time-shared computer system will avoid un authorization and invention of security computer systems, software passwords and codes were used. The biggest disadvantage is that it leads to large coding and decoding combinations. They also tried inventing unbreakable codes. Later used unchangeable passwords to improve security.

Each and every former invention of security systems has some disadvantages like direct access by a remote user, trying out all the combinations of passwords to find exact passwords, etc.

Security computer systems is the recent invention to prevent un authorization. The time-shared system acts as a central computer which is accessed using telephone switching systems with automatic tracing equipment. The information of a remote caller is obtained and is compared with file information using a comparator associated with security computer. If the comparison results are similar, then the security computer produces and transfers a acknowledgement signal to the time-shared system. Otherwise a negative acknowledgement is produced. Unless the access of a remote caller is from a proper station he cannot access the time-shared system. The security computer remains inaccessible to remote caller. Even though if a remote caller access a central computer, he cannot change the telephont no and data produced.

It is not necessary to create complex cryptographic techniques to improve the security of a system if we omit offsite security elements in a system.

Modification done by a remote user doesn’t affect the security since the security computer is not dependent on real-time computers. Along with automatic tracing equipment, the telephone switching system also has conventional switching equipment. It is combined with remote users keyboard through which the information is sent to the telephone switching system. The phone lines is combined with an online computer with the help of buffer present in real-time computer systems. So the telephone switching system establishes connection in a normal way. At the same time, the tracer will find the caller’s phone no and address and passes it to the telephone switching system. Additionally, it also finds time and date of call.

Information generated from a tracer is compared with file information present in real-time computers. Real-time computers also use passwords to scan the complete record of a file for caller’s information. As per the result of comparison, an acknowledgement signal or negative signal is produced.
If a shift register is used to store the callers phones no and address, then the comparison is made between the phone no and address within the shift register itself. According to the result, ACK or NACK is produced by the comparator. Memory access is controlled by a controller. The controller generates a password to address the file information. It helps in storing the required information in the comparator. Again ACK or NACK signal is produced.

The file information consists of lists of phone no’s and address from which a computer can be accessed from any location. Any location will compromise either single password or multiple passwords. Every combinations in the lists will be tried to find the exact passwords.

For every incoming call, the information like phone number , address, name, date and time will be gathered and sent to the security computer systems.

An internal security system is built inside a security computer. A user from a single location tries to access a real-time computer systems may times then that location will be ignored from the memory. Further access from the same location will produce a NACK signal.

Many security schemes were derived in order to improve the security mechanism. Every time when a user access the security computer, an unchangeable information is produced automatically.

V. COMPUTER SECURITY SYSTEMS

John G.Campbell,Carl F.Schoeneberger (1986) The computer security systems are widely used in data processing systems for maintaining confidentiality and integrity of information in terms of security, data processing system has many characteristics. That is, it can be executed using passwords and usernames or by improving the computer’s internal architecture. Hardware, firmware and software together forms an internal architecture. The system is designed in such a way that any user can access the system resources effectively.

There are 3 layers in the earlier computer systems. The first layer is called as “supervisor” and each layer is controlled by other layers. Firewalls were also intended to provide good environment for these layers to perform all the functions. But still many demerits exist in the system which reduces integrity of data.

In order to achieve security, we can distinguish 3 layers by introducing interfaces between them. “Graphics Package” can be encouraged to reduce the system failure. This type of system Is so effective that the database can be accessed only by the administrator.

The recently designed systems concentrates mainly on improving security by avoiding use of system resources by an authorized user. That is, an attacker can’t access others data. The main objective of this system is to provide a good environment of computer system based on capabilities.

In a system, domain’s resolves as a virtual machine. Each domain has minimum of 1 node. The keys used in the system are stored inside the node. Each key point to an object in the system using a pointer. A domain can make use of kernel functions to create keys(capability). A “factory” allows 2 domains to their resources. A “hole comparator” defines the ability of a factory whether it is trustworthy or not.

Data Processing s/y is also called as capability s/y. Here, objects are used executing an architecture where an Operating System is constructed. An object may be a key or domain. These objects can be inherited in any one of the following: hardware, firmware, software. The computer memory is divided into two parts:
1. Core memory-high speed memory ranges between 3ns to 250ns. Used for arithmetic calculation by data processing system.
2. Disk memory-Slow memory, consist of one or two magnetic disk memory units.

As mentioned earlier, keys are stored inside a node. These keys allows only authorized user to access the s/f resources. A domain can’t manipulate a key or node. Only a kernel has the ability to manipulate a key or a domain. Thus a s/y intergrity is improved by using kernel functions. It also avoids manipulationg one domain by another domain.

The disk memory is further categorized into:
1. Disk-page space
2. Disk-node space
Coded disk address(CDA)-determines the position of an object in the disk memory allocation count(ALC)- it is similar to allocation number of an object. When a frame is removed, the ALU value is increased.

ALC-INC is a flag representing the core table for implementing ALC.

There are 2 pointers-forward and backward pointers pointing the index space. Both the pointers are added for an item space entry.

A memory key comprises of page keys and segment keys. Page keys provide access to a page. Segment keys provide access to set of pages. Mode keys gives access to perform the operation read or write. Domain keys provide access to manipulate a domain. Device I/O keys allows only authorized I/O devices.

VI. NETWORKS WITHOUT USER OBSERVABILITY

Peter P. Gombrich, Richard J. Beard, Richard A. Griffée (1987) pointed the main risk that we are facing today in networks field is that an attacker can easily gain access and steal user’s information. Though the end-to-end encryption method is implemented, the network still remains unprotected. The user of both source and destination should be kept away from attacks. A public network station can be safer for a user rather than private network station.

The intention of this system is to meet the ISDN requirements, to avoid malicious and vulnerable attacks, to increase security and reliability. An attacker can steal one’s data in many ways. So the system is designed in a way to convert these attackers into stations and lines. To note is that the stations must be controlled only by a user who access it.

There are two possible ways to maintain security:
1. The message exchanged between the sender and the receiver bond is kept secret.
2. The sender and receiver bond is kept secret.

But the former option is considered as better option. The intruder will find difficult to gain the information exchanged between sender and the receiver.

A message is delivered to all the stations and so that the message remains unknown to the network. Implicit address are used based on their visibility state, that is, an implicit address may be visible or invisible. The “public-key cryptographic” system uses invisible implicit address where the message is encrypted using public key. Every station has to use a private key to decrypt all messages received.

The invisible implicit addresses also makes use of a secret way when compared visible implicit addresses are simple. Here, the user encrypts the message be prefixing it with a randomly chosen name. The implicit address acts as private if only sender knows the address. Implicit addresses acts as public if the addresses is known to all users.

Another mechanism “unlinkability” contains a station called MIX. It gathers all the message from the senders and transfers it to the receiver in a different order by altering the encoding scheme of the messages.

The relationship between a sender and receiver remains unknown for an attacker when we use multiple MIX’S.

To protect the confidential data, the sender can also produce a key for each and every message. Then the sender includes all the keys produced with the message. This is passed to the receiver in a secure channel. Usually, in LAN, the stations are connected in the form of rings. This also prevents access of unauthorized users.

The system performance depends on two major categories:
1. Transfer delay
2. Throughput.

A RING network can encourage only limited stations. More than 1000 stations will reduce its efficiency. But a RING network seems to be a better choice than a star or bus network.

In a MIX-network, only a specific station is chosen as MIX. Since we have to mix up each message, the content of the message becomes longer. Encouraging too many MIX’S may result in collision. The station that serves as MIX should have high throughput. Hence this method is more expensive.

We can divide the stations into groups in a networks to increase the performance. This type of network is referred as switched/broadcast networks(SBNS). If the acknowledgement signal is not received, the sender one transmits the
message. But this end-to-end retransmission may decrease the network performance. To avoid retransmission, the MIX-network can have backups or one MIX can replace the damaged MIX. The sender and receiver can exchange their message in a secure way. The content of the message remains unknown for an attacker. Integrity of the data is preserved. The network system proves to be stronger against malicious or vulnerable attacks.

TF Lunt (1988) in this paper discusses about the key problem of storage which is related with the process of having secured communication between each pair of user in a big network. The authors have used a method of finite incident structure with important features which is known as key distribution patterns. The extensive formulation of the process of storage scheme enables to use the theory of block designs and hence through this theory a number of examples of key distribution system are extracted. Through this paper the authors have introduced a number of new concepts and thus show how the theory of finite incident structure work with the key management problems.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Various methods developed for anonymizing data from 1984 to 1988 is discussed. Publishing microdata such as census or patient data for extensive research and other purposes is an important problem area being focused by government agencies and other social associations. The traditional approach identified through literature survey reveals that the approach of eliminating uniquely identifying fields such as social security number from microdata, still results in disclosure of sensitive data, k-anonymity optimization algorithm seems to be promising and powerful in certain cases, still carrying the restrictions that optimized k-anonymity are NP-hard, thereby leading to severe computational challenges. k-anonymity faces the problem of homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack. The notion of 1-diversity proposed in the literature to address this issue also poses a number of constraints, as it proved to be inefficient to prevent attribute disclosure (skewness attack and similarity attack), 1-diversity is difficult to achieve and may not provide sufficient privacy protection against sensitive attribute across equivalence class can substantially improve the privacy as against information disclosure limitation techniques such as sampling cell suppression rounding and data swapping and perturbation. Evolution of Data Anonymization Techniques and Data Disclosure Prevention Techniques are discussed in detail. The application of Data Anonymization Techniques for several spectrum of data such as trajectory data are depicted. This survey would promote a lot of research directions in the area of database anonymization.

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**APPENDIX**

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