

# Model and Mechanisms in Multiparty Access Control for Online Social Network

F. Faziyudeen<sup>1</sup>, T .Nalini<sup>2</sup>, Ayyappan. G<sup>3</sup>

M.Tech Scholar, Dept.of CSE, Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Chennai, India<sup>1</sup>

Professor, Dept. of CSE, Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Chennai, India<sup>2</sup>

Assistant professor, Dept. of MCA, Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Chennai, India<sup>3</sup>

**Abstract:** Online social networks have experienced tremendous growth in recent years and become a de facto portal for hundreds of millions of Internet users. These online social networks offer attractive means for digital social interactions and information sharing, but also move up a number of privacy and security issues. While online social networks allow users to control access to shared data, they presently do not provide any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with many users. To this end, we propose an approach to enable the protection of shared data associated with multiple users in online social networks. We prepare an access control model to take into custody the essence of multiparty authorization requirements, along with a policy enforcement mechanism and a multiparty policy specification system.

This paper we going study about model and mechanism systems in analysis of multiparty access control. The correctness of realization of an access control model is based on the premise that the access control model is valid...We pursue an efficient solution to facilitate collaborative management of common data in OSNs. We begin by investigate how the lack of multiparty access control for data sharing in OSNs can undermine the protection of user data. Some distinctive data sharing patterns with respect to multiparty authorization in OSNs are also identified. We make official a Multiparty Access Control (MPAC) model for OSNs

**Keywords:** OSNs, access control model, multiparty authorization requirements, multiparty policy specification scheme, a policy enforcement mechanism, Multiparty Access Control (MPAC)

# **I INTRODUCTION**

Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ are inherently designed to enable people to share personal and public information and make social connections with coworkers, family, friends, colleagues, and even with strangers. In Facebook users can allow groups, friends, and friends of friends or public to right to use their data, depending on their personal authorization and privacy requirements. Although Online social networks presently provide simple access control mechanisms allowing users to govern access to information contained in their own spaces, users, unfortunately, have no power over data residing outside their spaces. Such as, if a user posts a comment in a friend's space, he/she cannot specify which users can view the comment.

### Existing System

OSNs currently provide simple access control mechanisms allowing users to govern access to information contained in their own spaces, users, unfortunately, have no power over data residing outside their spaces. Such as, if a user posts a comment in a friend's space, he/she cannot specify which users can view the comment. In another case, while a user uploads tags and the photograph friends who appear in the photograph, the tagged friends cannot restrict who can see this photograph, even though the tagged friends may have different privacy concerns about the photo. To address such a serious issue, beginning protection mechanisms have been offered by existing online social networks (OSNs).

- > Access to a resource is granted while the requestor is able to demonstrate of being authorized.
- Every user in the group can access the shared content.
- > Not give any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with multiple users
- ➢ if a user posts a comment in a friend's space, he/she cannot specify which users can view the comment
- while a user uploads a photo and tags friends who appear in the photograph, the tagged friends cannot restrict who can see this photograph



#### Proposed System

Our solution is to support the analysis of multiparty access control model and mechanism systems. The correctness of execution of an access control model is based on the premise that the access control model is suitable. Moreover, while the use of multiparty access control mechanism can greatly enhance the flexibility for regulating data sharing in Online social networks (OSNs), it may potentially reduce the certainty of system authorization consequences due to the reason that authorization and privacy conflicts need to be resolved elegantly. We specially analyze the scenario like content sharing to understand the risks posted by the lack of collaborative control in online social networks (OSNs).

#### Proposed System Advantages

- > It checks the access request against the policy specified for every user and yields a decision for the access.
- The use of multiparty access control mechanism can greatly enhance the flexibility for regulating data sharing in online social networks.
- > present any mechanism to enforce privacy concerns over data associated with many users
- > if a user posts a comment in a friend's space, he/she can specify which users can view the comment

### **II WEB ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES**

#### A.Representing and Reasoning

We propose a systematic method to represent XACML policies in answer set programming (ASP), a declarative programming paradigm oriented towards combinatorial search problems and knowledge intensive applications. Compared to a few existing approaches to formalizing XACML policies. our formal representation is more straightforward and can cover more XACML features. Furthermore, translating XACML to ASP allows us to leverage off-the-shelf ASP solvers for a variety of analysis services such as policy verification, comparison and querying. In addition, in order to support *reasoning* about role-based authorization constraints, we introduce a general specification scheme for RBAC constraints along with a policy analysis framework, which facilitates the analysis of constraint violations in XACML-based RBAC policies. The expressivity of ASP, such as ability to handle default reasoning and represent transitive closure, helps manage XACML and RBAC constraints that cannot be handled in other logic-based approaches . We also overview our tool XACML2ASP and conduct experiments with real-world XACML policies to evaluate the effectiveness and efficient of our solution

#### B.Requirements for Web 2.0 Security and Privacy

The increased social networking capabilities provided by Web 2.0 technologies requires a examination of what we consider "private" and what we consider "personal" information, and will consequently drive a new way of limiting and monitoring the information that we make public online. Web 2.0 applications are creating large, composite conglomerations of personal data and so we need new approaches to describe and execute access organize on that data. "Private" information at present tends to be insecurely defined by legislation, rather than by what individuals consider to be personal. Generic information such as a person's home address and phone number are normally considered personally identical information (PII) and are to be protected when collected and stored by an organization in addition, the use and release of exact data, such as medical or financial information, is restricted legislatively. However, It also exists information that an individual may consider to be personal, and want to let loose only to people meeting particular criteria (such as people attending the same school) or particular people (such as close friends). Thus someone might want to control portions of their digital life in the same manner that they control what information is released in their analog life. In the world, a person can choose to tell someone or some group some piece of information about themselves. On the other hand, it is often the case that in the online world these controls do not exist, most important to de facto public disclosure.

## **III ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS**

A.Collaborative Face Recognition for Improved Face Annotation in Personal Photo Collections Shared on Online

# Social Networks

We propose a novel collaborative face recognition frame work, improving the accuracy of face annotation by effectively making use of multiple face recognition engines available in online social networks. Our collaborative face

#### Copyright to IJIRCCE



recognition framework consists of two major parts: merging (or fusion) and selection of face recognition engines of multiple face recognition results. The selection of face recognition engines aims at determining a set of modified face recognition engines that are suitable for recognizing query face images belonging to a particular member of the Online social networks. For this purpose, we use both social network context in an online social networks and social context in personal photograph collections. In addition, to take advantage of the availability of multiple face recognition results retrieved from the selected face recognition engines, we devise two effective solutions for merging face recognition results, adopting traditional techniques for combining multiple classifier outputs. Experiments were conducted using 547 991 personal photographs collected from an existing Online social networks. Our results demonstrate that the proposed collaborative face recognition approaches that only make use of a single face recognition engine. Further, we demonstrate that our collaborative face recognition framework has a low computational cost and comes with a design that is suited for deployment in a decentralized online social network.

### B.Protection model and policy language:

Social Network Systems pioneer a paradigm of access control that is distinct from traditional approaches to access control. The Gates coined the term Relationship-Based Access Control (ReBAC) to refer to this paradigm. Relationship-Based Access Control is characterized by the explicit tracking of interpersonal relationships between users, and the expression of access control policies in terms of these relationships. This work explores what it takes to widen the applicability of Relationship-Based Access Control to application domains other than social computing. We prepare an archetypical Relationship-Based Access Control model to capture the essence of the standard, that is, authorization decisions are based on the relationship between the resource owner and the resource accessor in a social network maintained by the security system. A novelty of the model is that it captures the contextual nature of associations. We work out a policy language, based on modal logic, for composing access control policies that support delegation of trust. We use a case study in the domain of Electronic Health Records to demonstrate the utility of our model and its policy language. This provides initial evidence to the feasibility and utility of Relationship-Based Access Control as a general-purpose paradigm of access control.

### C. Multiparty Authorization Framework for Data Sharing and An Active Detection of Identity Clone Attacks

We propose a multiparty authorization framework (MAF) to model and realize multiparty access control in online social networks. We begin by examining how the lack of multiparty access control for data sharing in online social networks can undermine the security of user data. A multiparty authorization model is then formulated to capture the core features of multiparty authorization requirements which have not been accommodated so far by existing access control systems and models for online social networks. In Meanwhile, as conflicts are inevitable in multiparty authorization and enforcement, systematic conflict resolution mechanism is also addressed to cope with authorization and privacy conflicts in our framework. We first examine and characterize the behaviors of ICAs. Then we propose a detecting suspicious identities, we propose two approaches based on attribute similarity and similarity of friend networks. The first approach addresses a simpler scenario where mutual friends in friend networks are considered; and the second one captures the scenario where similar friend identities are concerned. We also current experimental results to demonstrate flexibility and effectiveness of the proposed approaches. Finally, Some feasible solutions to validate suspicious identities.

### MPAC Model:

OSN can be represented by a relationship network. OSNs provide each member a Web space where users can store and manage their personal data including profile information, friend list and content. Indeed, a flexible access control mechanism in a multi-user environment like OSNs should allow multiple controllers, who are associated with the shared data, to specify access control policies. We identified previously in the sharing patterns, in addition to the other controllers, owner of data including the stakeholder, contributor and disseminator of data, need to regulate the access of the shared data as well

### We define these controllers as follows:

**Definition 1: (Owner).** Let **d** be a data item in the space of a user **u** in the social network. The user **u** is called the owner of **d**.



**Definition 2: (Contributor).** Let **d** be a data item published by a user **u** in someone else's space in the social network. The user **u** is called the contributor of **d**.

**Definition 3:** (Stakeholder). Let d be a data item in the space of a user in the social network. Let T be the set of tagged users associated with d. A user u is called a stakeholder of d, if  $u \in T$ .

**Definition 4: (Disseminator).** Let **d** be a data item shared by a user **u** from someone else's space to his/her space in the social network. The user **u** is called a disseminator of **d**.

MPAC Policy Specification:

The MPAC policies

(1) "Alice authorizes her friends to view her status identified by status01 with a medium sensitivity level, where Alice is the owner of the status."

(2) "Bob authorizes users who are his colleagues or in hiking group to view a photo, summer.jpg, that he is tagged in with a high sensitivity level, where Bob is

a stakeholder of the photo."

(3) "Carol disallows Dave and Edward to watch a video, play.avi, that she uploads to someone else's spaces with a highest sensitivity level, where Carol is the contributor of the video."

are expressed as:

(1)  $p1 = (Alice,OW, \{< friendOf,RN >\},\$ 

< status01, 0.50 >, permit)

(2)  $p2 = (Bob, ST, \{ < colleageOf, RN >,$ 

< hiking,GN >},< summer.jpg, 0.75 >, permit)

(3)  $p3 = (Carol, CB, \{ < Dave, UN >, \}$ 

< Edward, UN >},< play.avi, 1.00 >, deny)

# **IV METHODOLOGIES**

A methodology is the process of acquiring communication traces in large scale parallel application. **Modules Name:** Authentication (login /Registration), Profile, Friends, Send request, Group, Photos

Authentication (login /Registration)



Fig. 1 Example of an Authentication

Home

Social Network - Wir	ndows Internet Explorer	The second division of			and the second for th
C	//healbostd9d5d/SocialNetwork/Ma	airt/Herriscaupte		- 131 4+ × 5- Search	the web (Rabyton) 🔑 👻
Eile Edit View Fa	avorites Tools Help				
A Favorites A	🖞 Suggested Sites 🗕 被 Get more A	Addions +			
29 Social Network				100 - EXX - EXX - 100 million	- Page - Safety - Tools - 🚱 - **
10 million	The second se			100.000	100 miles 1
	!!!!FRIENDS FOREVER!!!!				
		Your post			
	Logout	vijay			
		vijay			
	kumar	1 per			100 Mar 100 Mar 100 Mar
	Contraction of the second second	1 1 4 4 4 4 4			
		nice			
		mce			
		View: Allow			
	My Account	Sharing: Deny			
	Home	[Like] [Unlike] [Share]			
		you Like			
	My Profile				
	My Friends				
	My Group				
	My Photos				
	Friends Request				
	Send Request				
<   Done				Internet   Protected Mode: Or	√n - € 100% -
Dune				- Internet   Protected Mode: Or	- 16 - 100% +

Fig. 2 Example of Home



## Profile

In this module user make our profile that details store in database the profile contains name, contact no, and email address, photos, and other information. Logged users can see their details and if they wish to change any of their information they can edit it.

🚁 Social Network - Windows Internet Explorer		and the second se			lon_no dillo metti Sime
C > C > Minute // Inter//Incalhost.51887/SocialMetwork/Profile/EditProfile.asps		A DATA AND A	- 1-21 ++ × 3		abyton) 🔎 -
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help					
📸 Favorites 🛛 🎰 🐲 Suggested Sites 👻 🐲 Get more Add-ons 👻					
Social Network			1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	- Call night - Page	🗢 Safety 👻 Tools 👻 🍘 👻
	Tell us about Your Self	Click Here			4
	I am: 👁 Male 🗇 Female	MobileNo: *****			1
	Birthday	Address: ****	0		
gowthaman		Your Photo::	Browse	Update	
				Citer and and an and an and	
My Profile	Tell us about YourCollege College Name:	Year_of Passing: **			
Profile	City see	Year_of_Passing			-
Change Password	City			(a) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b) (b	
My Group				Updata	
My Photos	Tell us about Your Company				
Restricted	Company Name:	Year_of_Exprience: *	NAA.		
Group	Your Role	Company Location: *	***		
Photos				Update	
	Tell us Somthing Abouts you				
	Achievement:	-			
	111	1.#1	line and the second sec		F
			Internet   Protected	Mode: On	-Fin
		Contract of the Owner of the Ow	and the second se		10/22/2012

Fig. 3 Example of Profile

### Groups

	/localhost.51887/SocialNetwork/Group/MyGroup.aspx vorites Tools Help			<ul> <li>Di + ×</li> <li>Search the web (Bo</li> </ul>	abylon) 🔎
	Suggested Sites + 20 Get more Add-ons +				
Social Network				🏠 - 🖂 - 🖂 📾 - Page	- Safety - Tools - 😡 -
100		100 A	<u></u>		
	44 At 100 30	A CONTRACTOR			
		<b>!!!!FRIENDS FOREVE</b>	D		
		IIII.FRIENDS FOREVE	Ruth		and a second
		YourGroup			
		Groups			
-		Friends	Remove		
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Familiy	Remove		A association
		BestFriend	Remove		
		ClassFriends	Remove		
	gowthaman		Add New Group		
	My Account				
	My Profile My Friends				
	My Friends My Group				
	My Broup My Photos				
	Friends Request				
				Internet   Protected Model On	≪ia - ₩1,100%

Fig. 4 Example of Groups

## Friend Request

In this module user select friend to send request. logged user view request accept our friend request

Edit View Favorites Tools	/SocialNetwork/SendRequest/Requesttofriend.aspx		▼ P for the web (Babylon)	م م
Favorites   suggested Sites				
Social Network			🏫 🕶 📷 🖛 📼 📾 🕶 Page 🕶 Sa	ety + Tools + 🚱 +
	60		a a	
		A coming		
		<b>!!!!FRIENDS FOREVER!!!!</b>		A.
				1000
		Send Request To Frie	nd	
		Enter Friend Name:		
		Enter Some Text:		
			-	The second
		Send Requ	iest	
	My Account			
	My Profile			
	My Friends			
	My Group			
	My Photos			
		0		-
			Internet   Protected Mode: On	- 100% ·

Fig. 4 Example of Friend Request



#### Photos

In this module user add new photo and publish the content based on our selected members in that group. Who appear in the photo, the tagged friends can restrict who can see this photo if (user = Allow) that User will be allowed to access the data's Else User will be not allowed to access the data's This module enables the user to upload the photos to their photo gallery and maintain their album.

#### V FUTURE ENHANCEMENT

We define security to the application where the data which is being shared by the owner in the wall of the friends profile is restricted to share in his wall based on the sharing policy defined by the owner.




Fig. 5 Example of restricted friends profile

#### VI CONCLUSION

In our multiparty access control system for model and mechanism, a group of users could collude with one another so as to manipulate the final access control decision. An attack scenarios, anywhere a set of malicious users may want to make a shared photo available to a wider audience. Suppose they can access the photo, and then they all tag themselves or fake their identities to the photo. In addition, they collude with each other to assign a very low sensitivity level for the photo and specify policies to grant a wider audience to access the photo with a large number of colluding users, the photo may be disclosed to those users who are not expected to gain the access. To prevent such an attack scenario from occurring, three conditions need to be satisfied: (1) there is no fake identity in OSNs; (2) all tagged users are real users appeared in the photo; and (3) all controllers of the photo are honest to specify their privacy preferences.

#### REFERENCES

[1] G. Ahn, H. Hu, J. Lee, and Y. Meng. Representing and reasoning about web access control policies. In *Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 2010 IEEE 34th Annual*, pages 137–146. IEEE, 2010.

[2]E. Carrie. Access Control Requirements for Web 2.0 Security and Privacy. In Proc. Of Workshop on Web 2.0 Security & Privacy (W2SP). Citeseer, 2007.

[3]J. Choi, W. De Neve, K. Plataniotis, and Y. Ro. Collaborative face recognition for improved face annotation in personal photo collections shared on online social networks. *Multimedia, IEEE Transactions on*, 13(1):14–28, 2011.

[4] P. Fong. Relationship-based access control: Protection model and policy language. In Proceedings of the first ACM conference on Data and application security and privacy, pages 191–202. ACM, 2011.

[5] J. Golbeck. Computing and applying trust in web-based social networks. Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland at College Park College Park, MD, USA. 2005.

[6] H. Hu and G. Ahn. Multiparty authorization framework for data sharing in online social networks. In *Proceedings of the 25th annual IFIP WG* 11.3 conference on Data and applications security and privacy, pages 29–43. Springer-Verlag, 2011.

[7] H. Hu, G. Ahn, and K. Kulkarni. Anomaly discovery and resolution in web access control policies. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies, pages 165–174. ACM, 2011.

[8] B. Viswanath, A. Post, K. Gummadi, and A. Mislove. An analysis of social network- based sybil defenses. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, volume 40, pages 363–374. ACM, 2010.

[9] G. Wondracek, T. Holz, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel. A practical attack to de-anonymize social network users. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 223–238. IEEE, 2010.

[10] E. Zheleva and L. Getoor. To join or not to join: the illusion of privacy in social networks with mixed public and private user profiles. In *Proceedings of the 18th international conference on World wide web*, pages 531–540. ACM, 2009.



### BIOGRAPHY

**F. Faziyudeen** is the M.Tech student of the department of Computer science and engineering in Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Deemed university Chennai(TN) India. His main areas of interest are Social Networks and web mining and their applications

**C** Nalini is the professor of the department of Computer science and engineering in Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Deemed university Chennai(TN) India. Her main areas of interest are Social Networks and web mining and their applications

**Ayyappan.G** is the Assistant professor of the department of master in Computer application in Bharath Institute of Science and Technology, Deemed university Chennai(TN) India. His main areas of interest are Social Networks and data mining and their applications