Keywords 
Wireless sensor network, Interne of Things, heterogeneous online/offline scheme, cryptography,
signcryption 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a booming field that has received considerable attention from both academy and
industry. The primary idea of IoT is permanent presence for variety of objects such as radiofrequency identification
(RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile phones, etc.which, through unique addressing schemes, are able to view each other
and collaborate with their neighbors to reach common goals[2]. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ad hoc networks
which consist of a large number of small sensor nodes with restricted resources and one or more base stations. Usually,
sensor nodes consist of a processing unit with constrained computational power and limited capacity. [6]To guarantee
unforgeability, integrity and confidentiality of communications, the traditional method is to digitally sign a message then
followed by public key encryption. [1] On the other hand, the base station is a powerful trusted device that acts as an
medium between the network user and the nodes.[1] WSNs have many applications, that includes military sensing and
tracking, environment monitoring, target tracking, healthcare monitoring, and so on. The data received from the sensors
through the base station can be read by users of WSN. If we wish to read the data from anywhere in the world, we need to
integrate the WSNs into the Internet as part of the IoT. [6]A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless network
consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices using sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental
conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at different locations. [3]There are three
methods to achieve this integration, frontend proxy solution, gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay solution. In the frontend
proxy solution, the base station acts as an interface between the WSNs and the Internet. There is no direct connection
between the Internet and a sensor node. The base station allows all incoming and outgoing information. In the gateway
solution, the base station acts as an application layer gateway that translates the lower layer protocols from both networks. 
In the TCP/IP overlay solution, sensor nodes communicate with each nodes using TCP/IP. The base station acts as a router
that forwards the packets from and to the sensor nodes. In both gateway solution and TCP/IP overlay solution, the sensor
nodes can communicate with the Internet hosts directly. However, new security challenges will appear, such as setup of a
secure channel between a sensor node and an Internet host that supports endtoend authentication and confidentiality
services. The computational power and storage of a sensor node are always limited. [5] A new identity based signature
(IBS) scheme without MapToPoint function in the random oracle model, which offers better performance than Other IBS
schemes from pairings. This ensures a better security aid for communication. The internet of things is nothing but
combination of sensors and connectivity 
[4]To support the authenticity of public keys in the public key cryptography, there are two main infrastructures
called public key infrastructure (PKI) and identitybased cryptography (IBC). In the PKI, a certificate authority (CA) issues
a certificate which provides an unforgivable and trusted link between the public key and the identity of a user by the
signature. The drawback of the PKI is that we need to manage certificates, including revocation, storage and distribution. In
addition, we need to verify the validity of certificates before using them. On the other hand, the dependence on the PKG
who can generate all users’ secret keys inevitably causes the key escrow problem in the IBC. For the WSNs, IBC is the best
choice because there is no certificates problem. However, Identity Based Cryptography is only suitable for small networks.
For the Internet security, we need PKI technique. 
A. CONTRIBUTION 
The motivation of this paper is to setup a secure channel between a sensor node and an Internet host that supports
endtoend confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrefusal services. In addition, we require that the IBC is used in
the sensor node and that the PKI is used in the Internet host. We also require that the computational cost of sensor nodes is
low. Our solution is heterogeneous online/offline signcryption (HOOSC). Concretely, we propose an efficient HOOSC
scheme. We prove that the proposed scheme has the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (INDCCA2)
under the bilinear DiffieHellman inversion problem (BDHIP) and existential unforgeability against adaptive
chosen messages attacks (EUFCMA) under the q strong DiffieHellman problem (qSDHP) in the random oracle
model. We have a computational problem called twin bilinear Diffie Hellman inversion (BDHI) problem. But for our
work bilinear DiffieHellman inversion is more suitable. Our scheme has the following characteristics: (i) It achieves
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrefusal in a logical single step. (ii) It allows a sensor node in the IBC to
send a message to an Internet host in the PKI. (iii) It splits the signcryption into two phases: offline phase and online phase.
In the offline part, most heavy computations are done without the knowledge of a message. In the online stage, only light
computations are done when a message is known 
B.RELATED WORK 
Signcryption [5] is a new cryptographic primitive that fulfills both the functions of digital signature and public key
encryption in a logical single step, at a cost significantly lower than that required by the traditional signaturethenencryption
approach. That is, signcryption can simultaneously achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrefusal
at a lower cost. The performance advantage of signcryption over the signaturethenencryption method makes
signcryption useful in many applications, such as electronic commerce, mobile communications and smart cards 
In 2010, Sun and Li [7] proposed two heterogeneous signcryption schemes. The first scheme allows a sender in the
PKI to send a message to a receiver in the IBC. The second scheme allows a sender in the IBC to send a message to a
receiver in the PKI. But their schemes are only secure against outsider attacks (i.e. attacks made by an attacker who is
neither the sender nor the receiver). Such signcryption schemes do not provide any kind of nonrefusal function. The insider
security means that (i) if a sender’s secret key is exposed, an attacker is still not able to recover the message from the
ciphertext and (ii) if a receiver’s secret key is exposed, an attacker is still not able to forge a ciphertext. [6]Our new technique allows the offline information to be reusable. It performs the signature generation procedure in two phases.
[6]The first phase is performed offline (prior to the knowledge of the message to be signed) and the second phase is
performed online (after knowing the message to be signed). In WSN, the offline phase can be executed at the base station,
while the online phase is to be executed in the WSN node. The online phase is typically very fast, and hence can be
executed efficiently even on a weak processor, such as a node in WSN 
In cellular communication concept, in allocated area only main cells can be accessed, for more detailed and large
information to be accessed, the main cell is further subdivided into many micro cells and the information is accessed. 
C.ORGANIZATION 
We use heterogeneous offline/online scheme in our paper. We show the working of HOOSC scheme in
exploratory section II. The formal model of HOOSC in section III. An efficient HOOSC scheme is proposed in section IV.
We analyze the proposed scheme in section V. finally; the conclusion is given in section VI. 
II. EXPLORATORY 
Given two groups C1 and C2 of the same prime order p, a bilinear map eˆ : C1 × C1 → C2 and a generator P of C1,
the qbilinear DiffieHellman inversion problems (qBDHIP) in (C1,C2,e^) is to compute e^(P,P)1/α given (P,αp,α2P,….,αqP).
We call bilinear DiffieHellman inversion problem (BDHIP) when q = 1. 
Definition 1: The (e, t)BDHIP assumption holds if no tpolynomial time adversary S has advantage Given two groups
C1 and C2 of the same prime order p, a bilinear map ˆe : C1 × C1 → C2 and a generator P of G1, the qstrong Diffie
Hellman problem (qSDHP) in (C1, C2, e^) is to find a pair (w, (1/α+w)(P) �� Zp
*× C1 given (P, αP,α2P,…..,αqP).
Definition 2: The (e, t)qSDHP assumption holds if no tpolynomial time adversary C has advantage at least e in solving
the qSDHP problem. 
III. MODEL OF HOOSC 
In this area, we give the definition and security notions oh HOOSC. The paper is based on the concept that sender
belongs to the IBC and receivers belong to the PKI. 
Setup: This is a probabilistic algorithm that runs by PKG that takes as input a security parameter k, and outputs a master
secret key msk and the system parameters params that includes a master public key mpk. 
IbcKg: This is used as a key generation algorithm 
for IBC users. The user submits an identity ID to the respective PKG. The PKG computes the corresponding secret key sk
and transmits it to the user in a secure way. 
pkikg: This is used as a key generation algorithm for PKI users. The user can choose its secret key sk and publishes the
corresponding public key pk. This public key needs a digital certificate that is sign by its CA 
offsigncrypt: This is a commonly used probabilistic offline signcryption algorithm run by a sender that takes input as the
system parameters param, a sender’s private key sks and a receiver’s public key pkr , and outputs an offline signcryption δ. 
OnSigncrypt: This is a probabilistic online signcryption algorithm run by the sender that takes as an input the system
parameters param, a message m and an offline signcryption δ, and outputs a full signcryption ciphertext σ 
Unsigncrypt: This is a deterministic unsigncryption algorithm that is run by a receiver that takes input as a ciphertext σ , a
sender’s public key pks and the receiver’s secret key skr , and outputs the plaintext m or the symbol ⊥ if σ is an invalid
ciphertext between the sender and the receiver. 
These algorithms will satisfy standard HOOSC scheme. 
For secure communication for integrating WSNs into the Internet, a sensor node is considered as a sender and an Internet
host is considered as a receiver. HOOSC provides a secure channel between the sensor node and the Internet host that
timbers endtoend confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation services. 
In Fig.1 there is a connection from nodes to host in internet through IBC and PKI. 
B. SECURITY NOTATIONS 
The standard security notations for signcryption are indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
(INDCCA2) and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen messages attacks (EUFCMA). We can modify the
notations slightly based on [6],[8] to adapt for HOOSC. 
Phase 1: A performs a polynomially bounded number of unsigncryption queries in an adaptive manner. In an
unsigncryption query, A submits a sender’s identity I Ds and a ciphertext σ . C runs Unsigncrypt(σ, I Ds , skr
�� ) algorithm
and sends the result to A 
Phase 2: A can ask a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively again as in the Phase 1. This time it cannot make
an unsigncryption query on (σ*,IDs
*) to obtain the respective plaintext 
Definition 3: A HOOSC scheme is (e, t, qu )INDCCA2 secure if no probabilistic tpolynomial time adversary A has
advantage at least e after at most qu unsigncryption queries in the INDCCA2 game 
Definition 4: A HOOSC scheme is (e, t, qk , qs )EUFCMA secure if no probabilistic tpolynomial time adversary F has
advantage at least e after atmost qk key generation queries and qs signcryption queries in the EUFCMA game. 
Fig.2 explains the steps for secure communication using heterogeneous online/offline scheme 
IV. A HOOSC SCHEME 
In this area, we propose an efficient HOOSC scheme which is based on barreto et al.’s signcryption scheme[9].
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups C1 and C2 of prime order p (with C1 additive and C2
multiplicative), a generator P of C1, a bilinear map 
: C1 × C1 → C2, and hash functions H1 : {0, 1}*→ Z*
p, H2 :{0,1}n×C1×C2→Z*p, and H3: G2→{0,1}n. Here n is the
number of bits of a message to be signcrypted 
For secure communication integrating WSNs into the Internet, a sensor node is considered as a sender and an
Internet host is regarded as a receiver. First, the sensor node is loaded with pre computed results δ = (x , r, β, S, T ) of the
offline phase from a more efficient device. When the sensor node wants to send a message m to the Internet host, the sensor
node runs σ =OnSign crypt(m, δ) algorithm and sends the ciphertext σ to the Internet host. In this process, the sensor node
only does light computations, such as exclusive OR, hash function, modular multiplication and modular inverse. When
receiving the ciphertext σ , the Internet host runs m = Unsigncrypt(σ, I Ds , skr ) algorithm to obtain the message m. Our
scheme simultaneously achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation. 
Fig.2 explains the steps for secure communication using heterogeneous online/offline scheme 
In this area, we propose an efficient HOOSC scheme which is based on barreto et al.’s signcryption scheme[9].
Setup: Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses groups C1 and C2 of prime order p (with C1 additive and C2
multiplicative), a generator P of C1, a bilinear map ˆe : C1 × C1 → C2, and hash functions H1 : {0, 1}*→ Z*
p, H2
:{0,1}n×C1×C2→Z*p, and H3: G2→{0,1}n. Here n is the number of bits of a message to be signcrypted. 
For secure communication integrating WSNs into the Internet, a sensor node is considered as a sender and an
Internet host is regarded as a receiver. First, the sensor node is loaded with precomputed results δ = (x , r, β, S, T ) of the
offline phase from a more efficient device. When the sensor node wants to send a message m to the Internet host, the sensor
node runs σ =OnSigncrypt(m, δ) algorithm and sends the ciphertext σ to the Internet host. In this process, the sensor node
only does light computations, such as exclusive OR, hash function, modular multiplication and modular inverse. When
receiving the ciphertext σ , the Internet host runs m = Unsigncrypt(σ, I Ds , skr ) algorithm to obtain the message m. Our
scheme simultaneously achieves confidentiality, integrity, authentication and nonrepudiation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have used heterogeneous online/offline signcryption scheme. It permits a sensor node in IBC to
send a message to an internet host in the PKI. Our scheme has chosen both online/offline technique and IBC technique to
reduce computational cost of sensor nodes to a greater extent. Internet hosts allows to support many terms such as endtoend
confidentiality, authentication and non repudiation services. We will use this scheme and work out for an industrial
application. It uses cellular communication concept of main cell and dividing it into microcell. Thus using the HOOSC
scheme we make WSN information more secure and implementing it in industry application. 
VII .RESULTS 
There are 10 nodes. UDP and TCP traffics are generated within the nodes. If there is congestion or traffic
problems within particular nodes, than there is a disconnection in the path, hence indicated by red color, hence the
transmission takes a different path for the information to be transmitted. It is indicated by the simulation result. 
Figures at a glance 



Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 


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